作者：(美国)卡维尔(Stanley Cavell) 合著者：江怡
Preface to Updated Edition of Must We Mean What We Say?
Foreword: An Audience for Philosophy
Ⅰ Must We Mean What We Say?
Ⅱ The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy
Ⅲ Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy
Ⅳ Austin at Criticism
Ⅴ Ending the Waiting Game: A Reading of Beckett's Endgame
Ⅵ Kierkegaard's On Authority and Revelation
Ⅶ Music Discomposed
Ⅷ A Matter of Meaning It
Ⅸ Knowing and Acknowledging
Ⅹ The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear
Index of Names
I do assert a distinction throughout these essays which, becauseit may seem either controversial or trivial, I want to call attention tofrom the beginning－a distinction between the modern and the tra-ditional, in philosophy and out. My claim is not that all contempo-rary philosophy which is good is modern; but the various discussionsabout the modern I am led to in the course of these essays are thebest I can offer in explanation of the way I have written, or the wayI would wish to write. The essential fact of （what I refer to as） themodern lies in the relation between the present practice of an enter-prise and the history of that enterprise, in the fact that this re-lation has become problematic. Innovation in philosophy has char-acteristically gone together with a repudiation－a specifically castrepudiation——of most of the history of the subject. But in the laterWittgenstein （and, I would now add, in Heidegger's Being and Time）the repudiation of the past has a transformed significance, as thoughcontaining the consciousness that history will not go away, exceptthrough our perfect acknowledgment of it （in particular, ouracknowledgment that it is not past）, and that one's own practice andambition can be identified only against the continuous experienceof the past. （This new significance in philosophical repudiation itselfhas a history. Its most obvious precursor is Hegel, but it begins, Ibelieve, in Kant. For it is in Kant that one finds an explicit recogni-tion that the terms in which the past is criticized are specific to one'sown position, and require justification from within that position. Aclear instance of such a Kantian term of criticism is his characteri-zation of an opposed "Idealism" as making the world "empiricallyideal and transcendentally real"; another is his diagnosis of "dialec-tical illusion."） But "the past" does not in this context refer simplyto the historical past; it refers to one's own past, to what is past, orwhat has passed, within oneself. One could say that in a modernistsituation "past" loses its temporal accent and means anything "notpresent." Meaning what one says becomes a matter of making one'ssense present to oneself. This is the way I understand Wittgenstein'shaving described his later philosophy as an effort to "bring wordsback" to their everyday use （Philosophical Investigations, 6; myemphasis）, as though the words we use in philosophy, in any reflec-tion about our concerns, are away.